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WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Tony Korioth*

I. PROCEDURE
A.

INTERROGATORIES

A Fullenwider
LTHOUGH it was an abuse of discretion when the trial court in
v. American Guarantee& Liab. Ins. Co. I permitted two
Jundisclosed expert witnesses to testify when interrogatories requesting the names of expert witnesses were not supplemented thirty days prior to
trial, the appellate court held this was not reversible error, unless it constituted harm to the objecting party. 2 Thus, the claimant was not harmed by
expert testimony which merely corroborated the claimant's own statements
that she was suffering from general asthmatic or allergic condition, where
there was further evidence that she had not inhaled toxic vapors from ma4
chinery as she had claimed. 3 The court in U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Pettyjohn,
held that a belated denial of the wage rate constituted good cause enabling
plaintiff to supplement answers to his interrogatories on the date of trial to
include persons with knowledge of relevant facts, so that a witness could
testify as to the employee's wage rate. 5
The court in National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Wyar 6 found that even
though the plaintiff, Wyar, was not named as a witness in the interrogatories
by the defendant insurance carrier, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial
court not to allow the plaintiff to testify as to whether the claimant had
received workers' compensation payments entitling the carrier to an offset
since the plaintiff could not be surprised by her own testimony. 7 The court,
however, found that the carrier was not entitled to an offset for the medical
benefits it already paid, since the carrier failed to meet its burden of proof.8
Another significant point in this case was the fact that the court allowed the
plaintiff's attorney to recover twenty-five percent of the accrued medical
benefits. 9
* B.A. St. Edwards University; J.D. University of Texas School of Law. Attorney at
Law, Law office of Tony Korioth, P.C., Austin, Texas.
1. 821 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, writ denied).

2. Id. at 663.
3. Id. at 663-65.
4. 816 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, no writ).

5. Id. at 842.
6. 821 S.W.2d 291 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ).

7. Id. at 294.
8. Id. at 297.
9. Id. at 298.
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS

In North River Ins. Co. of N.J. v. Greene,'0 the court held that a diary
error by the defense counsel, which caused the delay in filing answers to
request for admissions, was a clerical error that was good cause for filing a
later answer. " There was no indication that the deadline for filing answers
was intentionally ignored and failing to answer did not cause delay.' 2 Consequently, the court found that it was an abuse of discretion to deny the
defendant's motion to permit late filing of answers to request for admissions,
since deeming answers admitted resulted in an award of permanent total
disability benefits despite the claimant's acknowledgment that he was not
3
totally and permanently disabled.1
C.

JURISDICTION

In Specific Indem. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 14 the first workers' compensation carrier paid benefits to the claimant, and then sued the second
carrier and the claimant for reimbursement.1 5 The court held that the first
workers' compensation carrier must first present its claims to the Industrial
Accident Board (IAB) and pursue its administrative remedy before the IAB,
since trial court jurisdiction attaches only by way of appeal from an IAB
decision. 16
D.

DELAY IN FILING CLAIM

The court of appeals reversed and rendered a take nothing judgment in
City of Houston v. G. W. Garrett'7 when the jury found good cause for a delay
in filing a workers' compensation claim. 18 The court found that, as a matter
of law, the claimant did not exercise the degree of diligence which a reasonably prudent person would have exercised when the claimant filed his notice
of claim two years after his injury and two months after he had consulted an
attorney, despite evidence that the claimant relied upon a supervisor's promise to take care of the forms.19 The court in Providence Lloyd's Ins. Co. v.
Smith 20 upheld a jury verdict for the claimant, stating that a reasonably prudent person in the position of the employee's wife would have delayed filing
a claim for workers' compensation death benefits in reliance upon assurances
of a boss or employer, who was also a close personal friend, that "everything
would be taken care of" and a statement by another officer responsible for
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

824 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, writ denied).
Id. at 701.
Id.
Id.
834 S.W.2d 91 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, no writ).

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 92.
Id. at 92-94.
816 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
Id. at 801.
Id. at 802-03.
828 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ denied).
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workers' compensation that he had filed the claim. 2' The court found this
was evidence that the delay was reasonable, despite evidence that she had
received notice and claims forms from the insurer and employed an attorney
to investigate potential workers' compensation claim two and one-half
22
months before the claim was filed.
E.

COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE

The decedent in Jones v. Red Arrow Heavy Hauling, Inc. 2 3 was a selfemployed truck driver who contracted with the defendant to drive its
trucks. 24 The decedent's surviving widow sued for breach of contract because the defendant withheld sums from the decedent's paycheck for the
purpose of obtaining workers' compensation insurance. 25 The defendant admitted that it never obtained such insurance. 26 Without pleading offset as an
affirmative defense, the defendant introduced evidence at trial that the plaintiff settled a workers' compensation claim with the defendant's carrier, Protective Ins. Co. 27 The $72,000 settlement with Protective Ins. Co., however,
reflected the fact that the decedent was an independent contractor not covered under the policy which covers only the defendant's employees. 28 Since
the defendant was not a party to this settlement, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment for the defendant and remanded based
upon the fact that the plaintiff's settlement with defendant's workers' compensation carrier was a collateral source and should not have been admitted
29
into evidence before the jury.
F.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

The court in Taylor v. Argonaut Southwest Ins. Co. 30 affirmed the dismissal of a workers' compensation action, since the notice of appeal was not
timely filed with the Industrial Accident Board when it was mailed on the
twenty-first day, which was the day after Memorial Day, and received on the
31
twenty-third day after the board's ruling.
32
II. GROSS NEGLIGENCE DEATH CASE

The court in Granite Constr. Co. v. Mendoza 33 found the evidence factu21. Id. at 330.
22. Id. at 331.

23. 816 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1991, writ denied).
24. Id. at 135.

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 136.
28. Id. at 137.
29. Id.
30. 817 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1991, writ denied).
31. Id. at 723-24 (referring to TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (Vernon Supp.
1990)).
32. See also Godinet v. Thomas, M.D., 824 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1991, writ denied), infra under subheading "Emotional Distress and Fellow Employee."
33. 816 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ requested).
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ally sufficient 34 to support a finding that the employer was grossly negligent
when evidence showed that the employer knew about the peril of having
workers perform labor near traffic but failed to provide adequate work-zone
safety. 35 The evidence included testimony by a co-worker that the employer
refused to provide orange safety vests and failed to close off the nearest lane
of traffic with flagmen or barrels. 36 The court, however, found that an
award of pre-judgment interest was improper since the petition was filed
37
before the effective date of the statute allowing for pre-judgment interest.
III. TOTAL & PERMANENT INCAPACITY
The court in National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Soto38 reversed the judgment
for the employee because the finding of total and permanent incapacity was
against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. 39 In that case, following
the injury and convalescence, the employee was able to obtain and retain
employment over a considerable period of time at a higher wage than he had
been getting at the time of the injury.40 Also, there was no evidence that his
work was substandard or that he was given special treatment as far as his
4
duties were concerned. '
In Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Martin,42 a claimant, who suffered severe
burns over upper half of his body and had tendons and nerves removed from
both of his lower extremities in an attempt to restore function to his right
hand, suffered total incapacity and total loss of use of his right leg above the
ankle. 43 The court, in awarding life time benefits for these injuries, held that
victims of injuries having the same or similar effect as injuries listed in the
workers' compensation statute should be accorded the same benefits. 44
IV. HEART ATTACK
In National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Engelke,4 5 the court held that a circumstantial showing that the employee suffered a heart attack while at work and
that his duties normally involved strenuous labor was not enough to prove
that an accidental injury occurred for the purpose of recovering death bene46
fits under the Workers' Compensation Act.
34. Id. at 759 (finding that the defendant had waived its right to challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of gross negligence).
35. Id. at 764.

36. Id. at 763.
37. Id. at 766 (referring to TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.05, § 6(a) (Vernon
Supp. 1991) which is effective September 1, 1986, while this case was filed on April 16, 1987).
38. 819 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. App.-E! Paso 1991, writ denied).
39. Id. at 621-23.
40. Id. at 622.
41. Id.
42. 836 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, n.w.h.).
43. Id. at 637.
44. Id. at 638 (construing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, §§ 10(b), 1Ia (Vernon
1967) (repealed)).
45. 828 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ denied).
46. Id. at 325.
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V. EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AND FELLOW EMPLOYEE
The court in Godinet v. Thomas, MD.47 held that the exclusive remedy
provision of the Workers' Compensation Act barred a claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress against the physician who treated a fellow
hospital employee for work-related injuries. 48 The court also barred a claim
for an alleged violation of civil rights brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,
49
1988.
In Horton v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc.,50 the court held that an employee's tort claim against the employer arising out of an assault by a coworker who threw a paper wad at the employee did not fall within the exception to the exclusivity provision of the Texas Workers' Compensation Law
for intentional injury.5 1 The employee, however, admitted that her em52
ployer did not request or otherwise direct the co-worker to assault her.
Even assuming the employer was negligent or grossly negligent in failing to
further reprimand the employee for earlier incidents or supervise his behavor gross negligence could not rise to the level of intenior, such negligence
53
injury.
tional
VI.

COMMON LAW MARRIAGE IN KENTUCKY

The court in Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Borum 54 held that a widow
receiving workers' compensation benefits under Texas law is entitled to continue receiving those benefits even though she began living in a common law
relationship with a man in Kentucky. 55 Kentucky law does not recognize
common law marriages. 56 The validity of a marriage is generally determined
it is celebrated rather than the law and the
by the law and the place where
57
place where the suit is filed.
VII.

REFUSAL OF EMPLOYMENT

In St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Bjornson,58 the court held that an
injured employee who unjustifiably refuses employment suited to his incapacity and physical condition, which was made available to him at the location where he was injured, is not entitled to workers' compensation for
disability during the period of refusal. 59
47. 824 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).

48. Id. at 632.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 633 (construing TEX. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309d, § 6 (Vernon 1986)).
827 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied).
Id. at 364-65.
Id. at 365.
Id. at 370.
834 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied).
Id. at 399-400.
Id. at 399.

57. Id.
58. 831 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, n.w.h.).
59. Id. at 371 (construing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12a (Vernon 1967)
(repealed)).
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DATE OF INJURY OR DATE OF INCAPACITY
A.

401 FROM DATE OF INJURY

The court in Maryland Cas. Co. v. Duke6° held that permanent disability
benefits may be awarded for a full 401 weeks only if the date of injury and
the date of the incapacity are the same. 6 1 Where incapacity arises after the
date of injury, benefits are measured from the date incapacity commences
62
and extend a maximum of 401 weeks from the date of injury.

B.

DATE OF INJURY EQUALS DATE OF INCAPACITY

In contrast to the Duke decision, the court in Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N. Y v.
Stephens63 held that the date of injury for commencement of workers' compensation benefits was properly determined as the actual day the total incapacity began rather than the date of the accident several years earlier. 64 The
court stated that, based on the definition of injury submitted to the jury, the
"date of injury" would include subsequent precipitation, acceleration, or aggravation of any type of disease, infirmity, or condition, either previously or
subsequently existing by reason of any damage or harm to the physical structure of the body. 6 5
IX.

ELECTION OF REMEDIES

The court in Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Hearn66 held that the election of
remedies doctrine is a viable defense. 6 7 The exclusion of evidence offered to
prove an election of remedies is reversible error. 68
X.

COURSE AND SCOPE

In Duncan v. Employers' Cas. Co., 69 the court found that mental distress
or trauma and any resulting injury caused by a reprimand and demotion is
not an injury connected with the furtherance of the employer's business and,
therefore, is not compensable under the Texas Workers' Compensation
Act. 70 As a result, the court did not need to reach the question of whether
71
the trauma and injury were traceable to a definite time, place, and cause.
60. 825 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied).
61. Id. at 235 (construing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, §§ 6, 10(b) (Vernon
1967) (repealed)).
62. Id.
63. 832 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1992, n.w.h.).
64. Id. at 70-71 (stating that "the workers' compensation act should be construed liberally
to effect and bring about legitimate ends.").
65. Id. (noting that the carrier made no objection to the definitions of injury submitted to
the jury).
66. 830 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1992, n.w.h.).
67. Id. at 258.
68. Id. at 259.
69. 823 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, n.w.h.).
70. Id. at 724-25 (construing TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, §§ 1, 20; art. 8309,
§ 1 (Vernon 1967) (repealed)).
71. Id.
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The employee in Employers' Cas. Co. v. Bratcher72 suffered a ruptured
aneurysm while using the bathroom. 73 According to the personal comfort
doctrine, the employee did not go outside the scope of his employment when
he entered the bathroom. 74 Under the positional risks test, which is also
known as the "but for" test, however, an injury must have a causal connection to the employment. 7" Since the employee would have confronted the
risk of a ruptured aneurysm irrespective of any type of employment, the
76
injury was not compensable.
XI.

TO AND FROM WORK

The court in Highlands Ins. Co. v. Youngblood 77 held that an employee
who was killed in an automobile collision while traveling back to the plant
after the close of his normal work day to solve a serious operational problem
was in the course and scope of his employment when the employee's position
guide required him to be available for call at all times. 78
In Poole v. WestchesterFire Ins. Co.,7 9 the court reversed a summary judgment in favor of the workers' compensation carrier, holding that a genuine
issue of material fact existed about whether or not the employee received the
use of a company car as a integral part of his contract of employment, as
well as whether or not the employee, at the time of his injury, was in furtherance of the employer's business. 80 The mere assertion by an employer that
transportation provided by the workers' compensation claimant was an accommodation, without more, was insufficient to support a summary judgment on the issue of whether the employee's transportation was furnished or
paid for by the employer and, thus, fell within one of the three exceptions to
the coming and going rule which makes injuries sustained by employees
traveling to and from work compensable. 81 There was evidence that the
manager used the company vehicle with the advertising logo to make deliv82
eries before and after normal business hours.
The court in Tramel v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. 8 3 affirmed a summary
judgment in favor of the workers' compensation carrier. 84 It stated that if an
employee travelling to work was on a "special mission" at the time of the
accident, the employee would not be entitled to workers' compensation
when the accident occurred at a point in the route where employee would
72. 823 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, writ denied).
73. Id. at 720.

74. Id. at 721.
75. Id.

76. Id. at 722.
77. 820 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1991, writ denied).

78. Id. at 243-46.
79. 830 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied).
80. Id. at 187 (applying the two-part test set out in Rose v. Odiorne, 795 S.W.2d 210 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1990, writ denied)).

81. Id. at 186.

82. Id.
83. 830 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ denied).

84. Id. at 755.
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have travelled regardless of whether she was going to her place of employment or to the bank before proceeding to work. 5
XII.

CONTRIBUTION

In Carey v. American Gen. Fire & Cas. Co. ,86 the court held that, in order
to reduce workers' compensation recovery because of a previous specific injury, the insurance carrier must prove that the previous injury was
87
compensable.
Furthermore, the court in Wilson v. Klein Indep. School Dist.88 held that
expert testimony fixing the percentage rate by which prior injuries contributed to disability is required to support a reduction of benefits. 8 9 In the
absence of such medical testimony, the claimant was entitled to total and
permanent disability benefits and appropriate prejudgment interest. 90 The
Supreme Court, however, reversed and remanded in Klein Indep. School
Dist. v. Wilson 9 l and held "that expert medical evidence of a specified range
or percentage by which the prior injury or condition contributed to the disability is not required, provided there is detailed evidence which shows in
reasonable medical probability the cause of the injury and which concerns
how the prior injury contributed or probably contributed to the present
92
disability."
XIII.

BORROWED EMPLOYEE

The court in Zavala-Nava v. A. C. Employment, Inc.93 held that an employee's common law personal injury cause of action against a non-subscribing borrowing employer was not barred by the workers' compensation
statute, even though the lending employer was covered by workers' compen94
sation insurance.
In Marshall v. Toys-R- Us NYTEX, Inc.,95 however, the court held that all
that was required for the borrowing employer to be a subscriber was that it
paid the premiums on the workers' compensation insurance. 96 In this case,
the cost of such insurance was included in the fee paid to the lending em85. Id. at 757 (construing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § lb (Vernon 1967)
(repealed)).
86. 827 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1992, writ denied).
87. Id. at 632-33 (construing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306 § 12c (Vernon 1967)
(repealed)).
88. 817 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ granted), rev'd, Klein
Indep. School Dist. v. Wilson, 834 S.W.2d 3 (Tex. 1992).

89. Id. at 375 (construing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306 § 12c (Vernon 1967)
(repealed)).
90. Id. at 377.
91. 834 S.W.2d 3 (Tex. 1992).
92. Id. at 4.
93. 820 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1991, writ denied).
94. Id. at 16 (construing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3a (Vernon 1967) (repealed) but stating that the result would be the same under the new law).
95. 825 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
96. Id. at 197 (construing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309 (Vernon Supp. 1989)
(repealed)).
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ployer, who was the actual policy holder of the workers' compensation
97
insurance.
The court in Watson v. Nortex Wholesale Nursery, Inc.9 8 held that the
employer and a company related to the employer cannot elect which company is the employer for purposes of workers' compensation claims. 99
XIV.

MANDATORY COMPENSATION

In Wallace v. City of Midland,100 a case of first impression, the court held
that although a city had the discretion as to how it would fulfill its workers'
compensation requirement as a self-insurer either by purchasing insurance
or by entering into interlocal agreements with other political subdivisions
providing for self-insurance, it did not have the discretion not to cover its
employees one way or another.' 01
XV.

ATTORNEY FEES & ADVANCES

10 2

The court stated in Heard v. Liberty Mut. FireIns. Co. 103 that although a
client had a written obligation to reimburse his attorney for advances during
workers' compensation litigation and the court could enter a judgment for
that amount, the court could not order that the amount be paid out of the
exempt workers' compensation funds. 10
The court in Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Jones 0 5 held that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by awarding the claimant's attorney twentyeight percent of a workers' compensation carrier's lien for services rendered
in obtaining the lien, even though the carrier had retained its own counsel. 106 The claimant's attorney actively pursued the third party action which
resulted in a judgment against which the carrier was able to assert its lien. 107
XVI.

SUBROGATION

The court in Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Los Fresnos Consol. Indep.
School Dist.108 held that a carrier's right to subrogation' ° 9 accrues in a workers' compensation case when benefits have been paid or assumed and the
97. Id.
98. 830 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, writ denied).
99. Id. at 750.
100. 836 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, writ denied).
101. Id. at 642 (interpreting TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309h, § 2a (Vernon Pamph.
1992)).
102. See also Diaz v. Attorney General of State of Tex., 827 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 1992, no writ), infra under subheading "Subrogation."
103. 828 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, writ denied).
104. Id. at 459-60 (stating that TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8308-10.03(a) (Vernon
Supp. Pamph. 1992), prohibits an attorney from lending money to a claimant during the pendency of a compensation claim, but this law was not effective at the time of the suit).
105. 834 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
106. Id. at 119.
107. Id.
108. 829 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no writ).
109. Id. at 918 (referring to TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6(a) (Vernon Pamph.
1992) (repealed)).
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carrier assumes to pay benefits when it makes an initial payment and continues to make periodic payments thereafter. "o
The court in Durish v. Dancer' interpreted the Property and Casualty
Insurance Guaranty Act," 12 as it relates to the workers' compensation carrier's right of subrogation, against a third-party tortfeasor."1 3 The workers'
compensation carrier intervened in the suit to pursue its $46,587 subrogation
claim, and the employee later joined the receiver for the insolvent liability
insurance carrier. 1 4 After receiving a favorable jury verdict for $165,750,
the trial court authorized the employee to collect from the receiver the sum
of $100,000, which is the maximum allowed under the Guaranty Act.115
The judgment, however, specifically directed that the workers' compensation
carrier's subrogation claim could not be asserted against the $100,000 and,
instead, must be pursued against the insolvent insurance carrier's receivership estate from the funds over and above the $100,000.116 The appellate
court affirmed this decision finding that it comported with the "exhaustion
requirement" and the "nonduplication of recovery" provision of Section 12
117
of the Guaranty Act.
Steenbergen v. Ford Motor Co. 118 involves a wrongful death action where
the workers' compensation carrier intervened to enforce its statutory right to
reimbursement for compensation benefits paid to a decedent in the event the
plaintiffs recovered at trial.' 19 The court held that the workers' compensation carrier was not liable for costs incurred by an automobile manufacturer,
which actually prevailed at trial, since the Workers' Compensation Act was
120
silent as to the cost where no recovery has been had.
In Diaz v. Attorney Gen. of State of Tex. ,121 the Attorney General failed to
properly intervene in the workers' compensation case in order to seek back
child support payments from the workers' compensation proceeds where he
merely appeared at a hearing on the allocation of the proceeds and asserted a
claim. 122 The court held that an intervention filed after judgment is rendered is barred as a matter of law.' 23 The absolute minimum procedural
requirement for a petition to initiate a lawsuit for affirmative relief is not
110. Id.(relying on Hix v. Guillot, 812 S.W.2d 400, 402 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1991, writ granted); the court, however, was not unmindful of the fact that the writ of error

had been granted, stating that "until the Texas Supreme Court provides further guidance, the
rule announced in Hix is the only workable rule for determining when the cause of action for
subrogation accrues).
!11. 819 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, writ denied).
112. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.-28-C (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1991) ("Guaranty Act").
113. Durish, 819 S.W.2d at 259.
114. Id.at 260.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 261-62.
118. 814 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 97
(1992).
119. Id.at 762.
120. Id. (interpreting TEX. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306 et seq. (Vernon 1967) (repealed)).

121. 827 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no writ).
122. Id.at 21.
123. Id.
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waivable.1 24 Furthermore, the court held that an attorney is not entitled to
attorney's fees for his efforts to recover his fees under the contract, unless he
alleges and proves presentment of the claim 125
In City of Austin v. Janowski,126 the court found that it was not an abuse
of discretion to award the full one third of a subrogated employer's recovery
to the plaintiff's attorney, even when the employer's attorney actively participated. 12 7 Liability was not disputed, and the plaintiff's attorney handled the
discovery and the settlement negotiations. 128 The employer's attorney did
29
little more than file a plea in intervention and attend the deposition.1
130
The court in Massey v. Galvan held that the workers' compensation
statute sets out the maximum attorney fees to be awarded, however, the trial
court was not bound by a minimum amount.' 3 ' Therefore, it was not an
abuse of discretion for the trial court to award less than the thirty-three and
132
one-third percent maximum.

In General Motors Corp. v. Saenz, 133 the court held that, although there is
an exception to the rule making information concerning workers' compensation benefits inadmissible in a suit against a third-party tort-feasor for impeachment purposes, where the witness gives testimony inconsistent with the
receipt of benefits, a general statement
about financial need is not inconsis134
tent with the receipt of benefits.
XVII.

ARTICLE 21.21

After filing two workers' compensation claims, the plaintiff in Crawford &
Co. v. Garcia135 was fired by her employer for failure to comply with the
company and union work rules. 136 After reaching a settlement with her employer, she sued the insurance carrier and adjuster. 137 She claimed that their
alleged false, misleading, and deceptive act or practice in the insurance business was a producing cause of her termination. 138 The court, however, reversed the judgment in favor of the plaintiff stating that there was no
evidence to support this finding.' 3 9 Neither the insurance carrier nor its adjuster recommended that her employer fire the plaintiff; nor did they have
124. Id. at 22.
125. Id. at 23 (construing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001(1) and (8)
(Vernon 1990)).
126. 825 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, no writ).
127. Id. at 788-91.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 822 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
131. Id. at 320 (interpreting TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a(b) (Vernon 1967)
(repealed 1989)).
132. Id.
133. 829 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ granted).
134. Id. at 242-43.
135. 817 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied).
136. Id. at 100.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 102.
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any authority with regard to the decision made by her employer.14 0 The
court also found there was no evidence that the defendants interfered with
the plaintiff's sole right to select or choose a doctor, and consequently, their
acts did not constitute an unfair and deceptive act or practice in violation of
4
Article 21.21, Section 3 of the Texas Insurance Code.' 1
XVIII.

ARTICLE 8307c

The court held in Williams v. Fort Worth Indep. School Dist.142 that the
school bus driver who brought an action against the school district under
Article 8307c was not required to comply with the notice provisions of the

143
Texas Torts Claims Act.
In Investment PropertiesMgt., Inc. v. De Montes,'" the court held that a
terminated employee has the burden of establishing a causal link between the
firing and the employee's claim for workers' compensation benefits.' 45 She
does not, however, need to prove that the discharge was caused solely by her
filing a workers' compensation claim.' 46 Once an employee establishes a
link, it is the employer's burden to rebut the alleged discrimination by show47
ing that there is a legitimate reason behind the discharge.'
The court in Worsham Steel Co. v. Arias 48 held that an injured employee,
who had orally informed his employer of his injury prior to being terminated, could maintain an 8307c action for wrongful discharge in retaliation
for filing a workers' compensation claim, even though the actual filing of the
claim was after the discharge occurred. 149 The court further held, however,
that testimony as to the plaintiff being "sad" or even being "very sad,"
50
standing alone, is insufficient to support a claim for mental anguish.'
In Klein Indep. School Dist. v. Noack,15' a wrongful discharge case, the
court found that it was a reversible error to admit into evidence an administrative decision regarding a school employee's unemployment compensation
claim. ' 52 This was highly prejudicial, because it was fact finding by a state
53
agency which negated the defendant's defense to the claim in this case.'
Moreover, it was not competent evidence, because the Commission was determining whether there was any merit to the defendant's contention that

140. Id.
141. Id. at 102-03 (construing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 3 (Vernon 1981) and
Official Order 41060, § 1.003(b), Texas State Board of Insurance, June 4, 1982.)
142. 816 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ denied).
143. Id. at 839 (stating that an action under TEX. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c, § 1
(Vernon Pamph. 1991) is not an action under the Texas Torts Claim Act, TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. §

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

101.101(a) (Vernon 1986)).

821 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, no writ).
Id. at 694.
Id. (construing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. Pamph. 1991)).
Id.
831 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, no writ).
Id. at 84 (construing TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Pamph. 1992)).
Id. at 87.
830 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
Id. at 798.
Id. at 799.
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Noack was discharged for misconduct connected with his work, while the
issue in this case is whether Noack was discharged for filing a workers' compensation claim.
The court in Cedillo v. Valcar Enters. & DarlingDel. Co., Inc. 14 held that
it was proper to remove a workers' compensation retaliation claim under
8307c to federal court when pendant to a related and removable federal
question claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. 15 5
The court in McAlister v. Medina Elec. Coop, Inc. 156 established three
rules: (1) the exclusive remedy provision of the workers' compensation statute barred a claim for negligent or reckless infliction of emotional distress;
(2) the terms of the employee handbook did not expressly limit the employer's right to terminate employees at will and afforded no basis for a
breach of contract claim; and (3) conduct of the employer in terminating the
employee for economic reasons which was not extreme or outrageous, and
any emotional distress suffered by the employee which was not severe pre57
cluded the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 1
XIX.

ERISA

The court in Benson v. Wyatt Cafeterias, Inc. 158 held that the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) pre-empted plaintiff's state law
cause of action for a work-related accident when the employer purchased an
employee injury benefit plan which provided more benefits than what is required by the workers' compensation law. 159 The test articulated by the
court as to "whether the plan falls under the umbrella of ERISA does not
hinge on the employer's motive in instituting the plan, but 'whether the plan,
as an administrative unit, provides only those benefits' the applicable state
law requires." 16°
Gibson v. Wyatt Cafeterias,Inc. 161 concerns the same fact scenario as Benson. 162 The Eastern District of Texas, however, reached a different conclusion than the Northern District of Texas. 163 The court in Gibson held that
there was no ERISA pre-emption since this was a claim for personal injury
164
damages rather than benefits under an employee benefit plan.
The court held in Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Puckett 16 5 that the employee's action against employer's workers' compensation carrier for breach
66
of the duty of good faith and fair dealing was not pre-empted by ERISA. 1
154. 773 F. Supp. 932 (N.D. Tex. 1991).
155. Id. at 938, 941-42.
156. 830 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied).

157. Id. at 663-65.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

780 F. Supp. 1132 (N.D. Tex. 1991).
Id. at 1134 (construing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1985 & Supp. 1991)).
Id. at 1133 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 107 (1983)).
782 F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Tex. 1992).
Id.

163. Id. at 335.
164. Id. (construing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1985)).
165. 822 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
166. Id. at 141 (construing 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (1990)).
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XX. BAD FAITH 167
The court in GAB Bus. Serv., Inc. v. Moore 68 found that the evidence
supported a finding that the defendant, who handled the workers' compensation claims for the city, was an independent contractor acting under its own
authority and did not come within the protective ambit of the official immunity doctrine, since this claim was within the amount the defendant was authorized to pay without notifying the city. 169
The court in Chemical Express Carriers,Inc. v. Pina 7 0° held that an injured truck driver could not recover damages from his employer under a
negligence theory because no workers' compensation coverage existed and,
at same time, recover damages from the employer for lack of good faith and
fair dealing in its failure to give benefits as if there was workers' compensation coverage.'71 Workers' compensation and negligence are two co-exis72
tent, but inconsistent, remedies.'
In Transportation Ins. Co. v. Archer, 173 the court held that a workers'
compensation carrier owes no duty to a wife to deal fairly and in good faith
with her husband in processing his workers' compensation claim.' 74
In Guajardo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,17 5 the court found that, although
workers' compensation carriers should generally be able to rely on an expert's opinion as a reasonable basis for denial of a claim, a situation may
arise in which contrary medical opinion casts sufficient doubt on the reliability of the carrier's expert opinion. 176 If so, the carrier no longer has a reasonable basis to deny coverage.' 77 This, of course, is a question of fact for a
jury in a bad faith action which precludes summary judgment for the carrier
when the plaintiff brings direct or circumstantial evidence showing that the
carrier's expert's opinion was questionable and the carrier knew or should
17 8
have known it was questionable.
A physician in CNA Ins. Co. v. Scheffey, M.D. 179 sued the workers' compensation insurer for failure to pay promptly and fairly for the medical treatment which he gave to its insureds under Article 21.21 of the Texas
Insurance Code and for a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing
owed to him.'8 0 The court held that the insurer did not owe the physician
any common law duty of good faith and fair dealing and the physician
167. See also Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Puckett, 822 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied), supra under subheading "ERISA."
168. 829 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, no writ).

169. Id. at 350.
170. 819 S.W.2d 585 (Tex. App.-EI Paso 1991, writ denied).

171. Id. at 588.
172. Id.
173. 832 S.W.2d 403 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ granted).
174. Id. at 405.
175. 831 S.W.2d 358 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied).

176. Id. at 365.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. 828 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied).
180. Id. at 787.
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lacked standing to sue under the insurance code article regulating trade
practices in the business of insurance.18 1
In Rangel v. HartfordAcc. & Indem. Co., 182 the court held that the workers' compensation claimant was collaterally estopped from asserting a bad
faith claim against the carrier for a delay in payment of benefits by virtue of
prior agreement approved by the Industrial Accident Board, which settled
the compensation claim and expressly stated that the "the liability of the
carrier or the extent of the injury of the employee is uncertain, indefinite, or
incapable of being satisfactorily established." 18 3 The uncertainty of the carrier's liability establishes, as a matter of law, a reasonable basis for withhold84
ing of payments.'
185
the court held that a claim for the
In Allsup v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing against an insurer for its
handling of a workers' compensation claim arises out of the Texas Workers'
Compensation Act, since resolution of the workers' compensation claim is a
prerequisite to, and the first element of, any determination in the bad faith
claim.' 8 6 Thus, both the workers' compensation claim and the claim for a
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing could not be removed to
87
federal court.'
In direct contrast to Allsup, the court in Bastian v. Travelers Ins. Co. 188
held that an employee's action against the workers' compensation insurer for
a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing for its refusal to pay
workers' compensation benefits did not arise under the Texas Workers'
Compensation Act, but, instead, the bad faith cause of action sounds in
tort.189 Thus, the action for a breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing could be removed to federal court. 190
In Mroz v. United States FireIns. Co., '9' the court held that the settlement
of the workers' compensation claim does not bar a claim for the breach of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing on the theories of collateral estoppel,
judicial admissions, or judicial estoppel, where the cause of action was not
1 92
recognized in Texas until after the settlement was entered into.
The court in Soto v. Phillips9 3 held that res judicata barred the employee
from bringing claims, including a claim for a bad faith denial of benefits,
181. Id. at 790-92 (analyzing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21-2 (Vernon 1981 & Supp.
1992); Aranda v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 748 S.W.2d 210, 212-13 (Tex. 1988)).
182. 821 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied).
183. Id. at 199.
184. Id.
185. 782 F. Supp. 325 (N.D. Tex. 1991).
186. Id. at 327.

187. Id.
188. 784 F. Supp. 1253 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
189. Id. at 1255.
190. Id. at 1258.
191. 826 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
192. Id. at 730 (citing Aranda v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 748 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1988) as
the first time Texas recognized that an insurance company has a duty of good faith and fair
dealing in the handling of a workers' compensation case).
193. 836 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied).
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against his employer and workers' compensation carrier which arose before
the prior workers' compensation case and could have been tried in that
94

case. 1

In Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc., 195 the court held that an adjusting firm that
handled claims for a workers' compensation carrier has the same duty of

good faith and fair dealing to a workers' compensation claimant that the
96
carrier has. 1
In Aranda v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 197 a summary judgment case, the
court held that judicial estoppel is inapplicable when the compromise settlement agreement, which contained the statement that the liability of the carrier is uncertain and indefinite, was not signed or admitted under oath. 198

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at 268-69.
833 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, writ granted).
Id. at 548.
833 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).
Id. at 213.

